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1. Introduction  
Located in the Ring of Fire, a seismically active area in the Asia Pacific, Indonesia and the 
Philippines are two of the world’s largest producers of geothermal energy after the US, yet both 
countries demonstrate different trajectories of geothermal development. Despite Indonesia’s 
superior geothermal reserves (~29GW) it has only developed 5% of its potential compared to the 
Philippines, which has developed 56% of potential capacity (~4GW) (Koch, 2015; IEA, 2014a; 
Fronda, Marasigan and Lazaro, 2015). This puzzle raises the question of why there are disparities 
in the advancement of geothermal development, and namely why the Philippines is ahead of 
Indonesia, despite Indonesia’s greater advantage. Geothermal technology is the technology of 
focus because it both Indonesia and the Philippines have an abundance in geothermal resources, 
and developing geothermal technology requires overcoming several difficult barriers to 
development in comparison to other renewable energy technologies. Both countries have received 
substantial international development finance for renewable energy development, but many 
barriers to deployment remain in both countries. Bilateral and multilateral development finance is 
playing an increasingly important role in driving clean energy development in emerging economies. 
Multilateral development banks have financed more than US $131 billion in climate action between 
2011 and 2015; over half of mitigation finance was earmarked for energy related sectors and 30% 
for renewable energy (approximately US$39 billion) (AfDB et al, 2016). This paper investigates the 
impact of international development assistance for clean energy in addressing barriers to 
geothermal development in Indonesia and the Philippines.  
The main research question leading this research is: how has clean energy development 
finance impacted geothermal development in Indonesia and the Philippines? Have the financial 
mechanisms addressed the major financial barriers to development of geothermal technology? 
How have domestic political interests impacted the effectiveness of financing? To answer these 
questions, qualitative analysis is used, namely process tracing and data analysis of clean energy 
development finance for geothermal energy. The majority of data was collected through primary 
and secondary data sources, including interviews during field research in Indonesia (2014 & 2015) 
and the Philippines (2016).   
 
2. Literature on renewable energy barriers and development financing  
There are several barriers to renewable energy development faced by developing countries, and 
development finance attempts to fill the gaps to address some of these barriers. There is an 
extensive literature – mainly coming from economic literature – examining technology transfer and 
the specific barriers to renewable energy development in developing countries and those specific 
to geothermal technologies. These studies focus mainly on the barriers to renewable energy 
development. A set of further studies in political science have investigated the role of development 
finance in fostering renewable energy development. This literature explores for example how the 
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Global Environment Facility (GEF) funding as well as 
renewable energy project development finance has impact renewable energy policy adoption and 
in some cases, technology development. However, one of the gaps in this literature is an analysis 
of how the development financing addresses specific barriers. These major research studies 
exploring these themes will be explored in this section. 
  While there are numerous opportunities to use clean energy technologies to bridge the 
gaps between economic growth and emissions reduction, the innovation, adoption and diffusion of 
clean energy technology innovations has been slower than that of other technologies, particularly 
in developing countries (Worrell et al, 2001). The slow pace of innovation, adoption and 
development of clean technology innovations in developing countries is largely attributed to market 
and institutional failures such as lack of information, transaction costs, weak financing institutions, 
poor technological adaptability to the developing country’s absorptive capacity or technological 
sophistication (Acemoglu et al, 2012; Dechezleprêtre et al, 2012; Stoneman and Diederen, 1994). 
Specific to geothermal energy, major barriers include land use, high risks and costs for exploration 
and development, complex regulatory barriers and technology transfer (WWF, 2012). Additional 
governance measures such as incentives or development aid may be required to overcome the 
multiple barriers that exist in diffusing said technologies across developing countries (Popp, 2010; 
Popp, 2011; Johnstone et al 2010).   
 To address the financial barriers to renewable energy development and to incentivize 
policy reform and reduce risks, development aid targeted to clean energy development has been 
used widely in developing countries. The growing flows of clean energy development finance 
originate from multilateral, bilateral, transnational and regional agencies. However, there is limited 
literature that analyzes the effectiveness of clean energy development finance in empirical case 
studies, as well as the effectiveness of clean energy development assistance in addressing the 
barriers to renewable energy development in developing countries. Analyses of what works in terms 
of clean energy finance will be increasingly relevant moving forward in the post- Paris Agreement 
as the climate finance mechanisms are designed.  
The literature analyzing the impacts of climate finance finds variable impacts at the macro-
level, and in general studies at the micro-level (or field-level) seem to find limited effectiveness. 
Studies on the Clean Development Mechanism’s (CDM) effectiveness have been carried out by 
authors such as Michaelowa and Jotzo (2005), Castro (2014), and Chan (2015). Their overall 
findings show that the CDM instrument is limited in its ability to address renewable energy barriers 
to development in developing countries. Michaelowa and Jotzo find that there are substantial 
transaction costs associated with the CDM and various information barriers that may limit its 
effectiveness as a financial mechanism for emissions reduction (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). 
Castro’s monograph on CDM impact in the Global South highlights limitations of the CDM, including 
the unequal distribution of CDM projects, the questionable additionality of achieved emissions 
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reduction, and the social and environmental integrity of CDM projects (Castro, 2014).  Likewise, in 
his analysis of CDM financing for wind energy in China, Chan raised doubts as to the CDM’s impact 
on Chinese decision-making in the wind energy sector, and highlights the questionable additionality 
of various CDM projects (Castro, 2014).   
Looking at other forms of clean energy development assistance, authors such as 
Marquardt (2016) and Heggelund, Andresen and Sun (2005), focus on case study analysis to 
demonstrate impacts of development assistance, whereas Stadelmann and Castro focus on large-
n analysis. In a study on China, Heggelund, Andresen and Sun find that GEF has played an 
important role in China in raising awareness of environmental problems, promoting technology 
development and boosting institutional capacity (Heggelund, Andresen and Sun, 2005). 
Stadelmann and Castro conduct a large-n analysis to explore the determinants of renewable 
energy policy adoption in the Global South, and find that GEF funding and CDM projects have a 
positive relationship with the adoption of renewable energy policies or targets, yet comparatively 
insignificant to other determinants such as socioeconomic and institutional characteristics such as 
income level and provision of feed-in-tariffs (Stadelmann and Castro, 2014). Official development 
assistance (ODA) was not found to have a significant relationship on renewable energy policy 
adoption, aside from an “almost significant at the 10% level” with feed-in-tariffs adoption. In another 
study, Marquardt, Steinbacher and Schreurs find that while donor driven renewable energy projects 
do not force energy transitions in developing countries, donor support has helped to drive the 
integration of renewables into energy development as demonstrated in case studies in Morocco 
and the Philippines (Marquardt, Steinbacher and Schreurs, 2016).  A number of studies examined 
the limitations of project-based sustainable energy financing on energy transitions and energy 
access, such as those by Terrapon-Pfaff et al (2014), Bhattacharyya (2013) and Marquardt (2015; 
2016).   
The literature on transnational governance emerged in the 1970s in parallel to the growing 
Another strand of research evaluates the institutional innovation emerging to solve climate change 
governance problems such as transnational governance and polycentric governance. Authors such 
as Bulkeley et al (2014), Andonova et al (2009), Jordan et al (2015), Shreurs (2016) illustrate the 
governance evolution in solving public goods problems like climate change through the involvement 
of non-state and transnational actors, as well as the challenges in addressing the problems. These 
studies have advanced our understanding of climate change governance, but have not delved into 
extensive analysis that allows for measures of effectiveness.  
These insights are relevant to the study of the adoption of renewable energy policy and 
development of geothermal installed capacity in Indonesia and the Philippines since they highlight 
the pathways through which development finance can impact policy and technology adoption. 
These studies probe the effectiveness of clean energy development assistance in addressing 
barriers to renewable energy development in developing countries, finding some support of impacts 
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but limited effectiveness. Some of the important limitations are highlighted by these studies—the 
failures of development assistance to target countries in need and to address structural power 
barriers, the questionable additionality of the development projects, and the high transaction costs 
of some of the finance mechanisms that make participation costly. Nevertheless, the literature 
measuring effectiveness of clean energy development assistance lacks a sufficient scope of 
countries and depth in analysis that evaluates the match between the barriers to renewable energy 
development and the focus of clean energy finance. The literature is also limited in comparative 
analysis or its exploration of domestic political interests as interfering with the impacts of 
development finance. 
 
3. Concepts on mechanisms of clean energy development finance impact 
 
To conceptualize how international clean energy development finance might impact domestic 
interests and institutions, this paper draws upon regime theory and private governance literature to 
examine the impacts or effectiveness of development finance and projects for clean energy. 
Effectiveness of a regime can be measured based upon how closely it solves the public goods 
problem, which it was created to address (Young and Levy, 1999: 4). To create an initial framework 
for analyzing the different effects of development finance, I adapt Young and Levy’s typology of 
pathways through which regimes affect outcomes and Carbonnier, Brugger and Krause’s 
interpretation of this framework for non-binding agreements as it provides insights to the many 
ways the formal and informal international institutions can influence state behavior, national policy, 
and realign domestic interests (Carbonnier, Brugger and Krause, 2011). 1  I focus on three 
mechanisms of impact through which the clean energy development finance can impact outcomes 
in renewable energy development in developing countries (or recipient countries of development 
assistance). These mechanisms include: utility modifier, social learning, and capacity building (see 
Figure 1 below for examples of each mechanism). They are evaluated as they relate to policy 
implementation and renewable energy development, namely by addressing barriers to geothermal 
energy development. Using Young and Levy’s definition, the utility modifier mechanism can change 
actors’ cost and benefit analysis as new rules or opportunities are introduced (Young and Levy 
1999: 22). Utility modifier mechanism is the incentivization of renewable energy development 
through financial assistance that changes the cost benefit analysis of actors. In the case of 
geothermal development, the utility modifier mechanism takes the form of development assistance 
earmarked for investment in geothermal power plant development or power sector development. 
The utility modifier mechanism is visible in financial assistance provided by the World Bank and 
other multilateral, regional and bilateral agencies to invest in geothermal capacity and to assist the 
                                                        
1Carbonnier, Brugger and Krause applied Young and Levy’s framework to voluntary regime as well to 
measure effectiveness, which they found as a useful framework. I will also look at his application of this 
framework as reference as well. 
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government in implementing the Geothermal Laws and carry out construction of geothermal 
projects. Through these financial resources, critical gaps in financing are filled.  
The social learning mechanism can occur through the provision of information that 
produces a clearer picture of a problem, which can lead to a new perspective on solving a problem 
or alternative measures for problem solving and implementation (Young and Levy, 1999; Haas, 
1989). Social learning requires a cognitive change such as the beliefs of cause and effect to 
change, not merely through the transfer and reproduction of existing policies (Elkins and Simmons, 
2005; Dobbins, Simmons and Garrett, 2007; Sabatier, 1988; Clark, Jager and van Eijndhoven, 
2001: 14). The social learning mechanism would be evident through development financing for 
policy advising and capacity building for policymakers to help reform policies to better facilitate 
development of geothermal and diffuse norms prioritizing renewable energy development. The 
capacity building mechanism is the provision of resources directed to building human capacity—
through training and education. For this paper, the capacity building mechanism can take the form 
of international development assistance for training the technical workforce, or scholarships for 
skills related to geothermal development.  
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Figure 1: Mechanisms of clean energy finance and barriers to geothermal development 
 
 
4. Renewable energy in Indonesia and the Philippines 
The political economic history in both Indonesia and the Philippines provides insights into their 
current status of geothermal energy development. The Philippines is the world’s second largest 
producer of geothermal energy after the U.S. and Indonesia follows at the world’s third largest 
producer (Think Geoenergy, 2016). This is significant since Indonesia holds 40% of the world’s 
reserves in geothermal energy, far surpassing the Philippines, but Indonesia has only developed a 
fraction of its potential resources, unlike the Philippines.  
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Figure 2: Installed Generating Capacity in Indonesia and the Philippines 
 
Source: Indonesia: EIA (2015), Philippines: DoE (2015) 
 
As further demonstrated in Figure 2 above, Indonesia’s renewable energy only makes up 
4% of its overall installed capacity, whereas in the Philippines, the share is over one-third of 
installed capacity (34%). In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, the installed generating 
capacity is also representative of the natural resource abundance in the country—whereby 
Indonesia has an abundance of fossil fuels and the Philippines does not. Under the Suharto regime, 
Indonesia made use of its energy abundance by investing in oil development and profiting from the 
rising oil prices in light of the 1973 Oil Crisis; it later joined the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a member in 1962 (OPEC, 2017). In contrast, the Philippines was 
rocked by global and national energy crises, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis and the 1990s Power 
Crisis, and the energy insecurity drove the Marcos and Aquinos/Ramos regimes to prioritize 
geothermal energy in their energy development plans. The 1990s Power Sector Crisis was caused 
by poor energy development planning when the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant was cancelled due to 
corruption concerns; no other energy development strategies were planned to fill the missing 
capacity to meeting growing demand, leading to major supply shortages and massive failures 
across the Philippines in the 1990s (KPMG, 2014; Cham, 2007). 
Focusing more specifically on geothermal installed capacity, Figure 3 below depicts the 
trends in the development of installed geothermal capacity over time in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Indonesia clearly lags behind the Philippines in total installed capacity, and success in 
the Philippines’ development of geothermal energy preceded Indonesia’s despite the fact that both 
countries began exploring geothermal resources in the 1960s and 1970s.  The energy mixes of 
both countries has played a fundamental role in impacting the priority placed on energy 
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diversification and renewable energy development, echoing findings from Houle et al that material 
resources affect policy choices (Houle et al, 2015). Endowed with oil resources, Indonesia 
benefitted greatly from the 1973 Oil Crisis and the increasing price of oil supported economic 
growth in the country throughout the 1970s to 1990s. The Philippines in contrast relied on oil 
imports to meet its fossil fuel demand, and was severely impacted by the oil embargo of the 1973 
crisis. As a result, the Philippines government under Marcos first imposed Martial Law and then 
redirected government resources to developing geothermal energy to meet energy needs. Of 
course, individual actors have influenced the energy development choices that Indonesia and the 
Philippines have taken in response to the external shocks and the respective natural resource 
abundance. 
 
Figure 3:  Installed geothermal capacity in Indonesia and the Philippines 
Source: Fronda et al (2015), IEA (2014) 
 
In Figure 3 above, spurts of growth in installed capacity are visible in the Philippines 
between the late 1970s and early 1980s and then again in the early 1990s. There is a dip in 
Philippines geothermal installed capacity from 2010-2013 (decrease from 1,972 MWe to 1,847 
MWe) as a set of geothermal plants were decommissioned, including Northern Negros, Tiwi and 
Bacman (Fronda et al, 2015). Likewise in Indonesia, there is a jump in installed geothermal capacity 
developed starting in the mid-1990s through the early 2000s. These growth rates in installed 
capacity are linked to major energy and economic crises and external shocks, including the 1973 
Oil Crisis and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In the Philippines, the Oil Crisis in the 1970s and the 
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Power Sector Crisis in 1990s led to rapid geothermal energy development. Whereas in Indonesia, 
the shift from being a net-exporter of oil to net-importer of oil in 2004, and formal withdrawal from 
OPEC marked a shift in the government’s prioritization of geothermal development in additional to 
other renewable energy technologies. The overall system capacity in Indonesia is dramatically 
higher than shown in this figure, yet due to barriers to development—full potential has yet to be 
reached. 
The political and socioeconomic histories in Indonesia and the Philippines have created a 
set of vested interests and subsequent barriers to geothermal energy development. The fact that 
the current ownership of power sector assets in both countries is still dominated by state-owned 
enterprises despite power sector reforms is demonstrative of barriers to private investment. The 
variety of interests and institutions impacting energy development, particularly relevant to 
geothermal energy, are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Political economy of Indonesia and the Philippines  
 
Indonesia Philippines 
GDP (2016) 
(per capita) 
Growth rate  
USD 932 billion 
(USD 3,570.3) 
5% 
USD 304.9 billion 
(USD 2,951.1) 
6.9% 
Political regime • Democratic since 1999 
• Historical authoritarian dictatorship 
under Suharto and Sukarno 
• Democratic since 1986 
• Historical authoritarian dictatorship 
under Marcos 
Major state actors  
(domestic 
institutions) 
Ministry of Energy (MEMR/EBTKE) 
PLN: SOE electricity utility  
Pertamina Geothermal (PGE): SOE 
geothermal producer (63% assets) 
Local gov 
Dept of Energy 
National Power Corporation: SOE 
electricity utility 
EDC*: SOE Energy developer until 2007 
when privatized 
 
Major private 
players 
Chevron, Supreme Energy, 
Geodipa, INAGA, Oil and Gas Mafia 
EDC*, PGI (Chevron/Unocal), NGAP, 
Catholic Church 
International 
institutions 
 
KfW, ADB, JICA/JBIC, CTF/CIFs, World 
Bank, IMF, USAID, UNFCCC CDM, 
WWF,  
KfW, ADB, IMF, New Zealand, UNFCCC 
CDM, WWF 
 
Looking first at the institutions, actors and interests in Indonesia and then in the Philippines, there 
are a plethora of conflicting and vested interests that are involved in energy development planning. 
The list shown in Table 1 is not comprehensive, but provides a summary of some of the major 
institutions and players.  
 
Indonesia’s institutions, actors and interests 
In Indonesia, the needs and interests of regional and central government, ministries, independent 
power producers, and Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN)—the state-owned electricity utility – are 
often misaligned (Budiman, 2014). The key actors in governing the power sector include the 
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regional governments, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR), and the Ministry of 
Finance, Perusahaan Listrik Negara (state owned electricity utility), and Independent Power 
Producers. While PLN no longer holds a monopoly over supply, it still holds a monopoly over 
transmission (DIFFER, 2012). While PLN must make a profit as a company, it is also legally 
obligated to provide energy services and infrastructure to the poorest regions and populations 
under Law 30/2007. This creates contradictory objectives and clear challenges to PLN’s operations 
and often places renewable energy at a lower priority. The 2009 report by JICA titled “Study on 
Fiscal and Non-Fiscal Incentives to Accelerate Private Sector Geothermal Energy Development in 
the Republic of Indonesia” sums up the institutional interests related to geothermal development 
well: 
““The barriers which hinder smooth development of geothermal energy are the 
development risks of underground resources and the burden of enormous up-front 
investment. Therefore, the purchase price of geothermal energy should include a 
reward for challenging these barriers. Consequently, although it is lower than the 
price of diesel or heavy-oil power plant energy, the price of geothermal energy 
becomes higher than that of coal-fired plant energy. PT PLN, a buyer of 
geothermal energy, has a mission to supply inexpensive power to consumers and 
this mission makes it reluctant to increase the purchase price it pays for 
geothermal energy. The unattractive purchase price of PT PLN causes private IPP 
companies hesitation in investing geothermal projects in Indonesia” (JICA, 2009: 
ES-1). 
 
The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) holds the most central role since 
it is responsible for developing energy policy, supervising day-to-day activities of the energy sector, 
as well as the energy planning, funding and regulation (Damuri and Atje, 2013). The MEMR also 
oversees state-owned enterprises and provides data and analyses. Under the MEMR, the 
Directorate of Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation (EBTKE) was created as a sub-
ministerial agency in 2010. The creation of the Directorate strengthened oversight of renewable 
energy and energy efficiency activities. Local governments hold significant authority in Indonesia 
as a result of the 2001 decentralization process under the democratic transition post-Suharto, 
commonly referred to as “Reformasi.” They play a key role in the implementation of energy policy 
by developing regulations and issuing permits for exploration and development of renewable 
energy projects. However, overlapping jurisdictions, vested interests and lengthy permit 
procedures have acted as a hindrance to implementation (EIA, 2015; Fox et al, 2006). They have 
an interest to maintain the authority over geothermal concession bidding, despite the inefficiencies, 
owing to the rent seeking benefits (Cahyafitri, 2015; Winters and Cawvey, 2015). 
 In terms of power producers, Pertamina Geothermal (and PLN) own 63% of the geothermal 
assets (Yunis, 2015). Pertamina Geothermal is a subsidiary of Pertamina Persero, the state-owned 
oil company, but handles the geothermal development. Pertamina has been exploring and 
developing geothermal projects since the 1970s. However, Pertamina’s interest in prioritizing 
geothermal energy is dependent on profits and energy security concerns, and throughout 
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Indonesia’s history, the priority of geothermal energy has risen and fallen over time. Most recently, 
PLN is in a discussion of taking over Pertamina Geothermal’s geothermal assets, which would be 
coordinated through the Ministry of SOEs (Amindoni, 2016). The Government of Indonesia has 
been pushing for this acquisition because it is interested to appoint PLN as the focal point for 
geothermal development to boost development and progress towards its ambitious energy mix 
targets. 
 Private independent power producers (IPPs) are mainly limited to large multinational 
corporations, like Chevron, but some smaller Indonesian players, such as Supreme Energy have 
broken through the numerous barriers to build geothermal projects in Indonesia. Their main 
interests are to remove regulatory and sociocultural barriers to development, such as improving 
the lengthy permitting process or renegotiating electricity tariffs with PLN. IPPs act through the 
Indonesian Geothermal Association (INAGA) that lobbies on behalf of the geothermal industry for 
regulatory reforms.  
 Beyond the institutions and actors directly involved with geothermal development, it is 
important to note the actors with vested interests in energy development.  First and foremost, the 
history of oil production in Indonesia has slanted the prioritization in energy development plans 
towards fossil fuels. The long history of fossil fuel subsidies (and huge share of government 
expenditures) also means that the government prioritizes investing in fossil fuels instead of 
infrastructure or subsidies for clean energy development (Chelminski, 2016). The largest barrier to 
the renewable energy development is seen as the deeply embedded sub-national political interests 
in coal, oil and natural gas, and corruption related to the “oil and gas mafia”, cronyism and rent-
seeking (Cahyafitri, 2015; Winters and Cawvey, 2015). Corruption included embezzlement of funds 
from the Ministry of Energy, extortion, tax fraud and smuggling (Cassin, 2014; Sukoyo, 2014). While 
fossil fuel subsidies have undergone reforms over time, the reduced fuel subsidy budget has not 
led to increases in subsidies or investment in renewable energy development. 
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Philippines institutions, actors and interests 
In the public sphere in the Philippines, the Department of Energy is the government ministry 
charged with the creation of policies and regulations governing energy development. However, 
historically the majority of geothermal resources were developed under the Ferdinand Marcos and 
Ramos regimes to maintain energy security during the 1973 Oil Crisis and the 1990s Power Crisis. 
Following the confirmation of the geothermal resources in Tiwi, the government invested full 
resources in exploring geothermal potential by creating the Energy Development Corporation 
(EDC) under the state-owned company, Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), in 1976. The 
EDC was tasked with the mandate to “Explore, develop, produce, generate and market indigenous 
energy sources and lessen the country’s dependence on imported fuel.”2 EDC worked with the 
National Power Corporation under Marcos’ direction. EDC was guaranteed offtake by the National 
Power Corporation for geothermal steam fields and the financing of project exploration and 
development was guaranteed by the Government.  
Still today, the National Power Corporation and EDC (now privatized) are still involved as 
major players in geothermal development. However, the since power sector privatized and 
operates as a spot market, there is no guarantee of offtake for geothermal electricity generation 
and utilities are driven by profits and shorter term PPAs, which puts geothermal at a disadvantage 
compared to coal and natural gas (Uy, 2016; Hernandez, 2016). Geothermal assets are owned 
mostly by EDC (75%) and the remaining 25% is owned by Philippines Geothermal, Inc. (PGI is a 
subsidiary of Chevron/Unocal), demonstrating issues with the competitiveness of the market and 
the risks facing new geothermal developers to develop geothermal projects (Dolor, 2006). The 
major barriers facing new geothermal projects in the Philippines are summarized below in Table 2. 
The Philippines National Geothermal Association (NGAP) lobbies on behalf of the geothermal 
industry for regulatory reform.  
Another non-governmental player that has been active in promoting renewable energy 
regulations and development is the Catholic Church in the Philippines. The Catholic Church 
became involved in anti-coal mining and against logging, and had a highly influential voice in the 
Philippine policy space. The Catholic Church, along with the Renewable Energy Commission—an 
institutionalized transnational advocacy network consisting of civil society, government and private 
actors, including Aboitiz, Vestas, EDC, Chevron, Greenpeace, and a variety of renewable energy 
companies—were instrumental in successfully advocating for the creation of a Renewable Energy 
Law, eventually adopted in 2002 (Senga, 2016). This law helped establish a new clause 
ameliorating a barrier to foreign ownership of geothermal assets (discussed in Table 2 and the 
section below).   
Turning to the major barriers to geothermal development, I examine the financial, 
regulatory and sociocultural barriers, focusing on the financial barriers. Table 2 summarizes some 
                                                        
2 See: http://www.energy.com.ph/about-edc/milestones/  
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of the major obstacles and challenges to geothermal energy development (and renewable energy 
more broadly). 
 
Table 2: Major barriers to geothermal development in Indonesia and the Philippines  
 
 
Case Study 
 
 
Financial Barriers 
 
 
Regulatory Barriers 
 
Human Capacity and Technical 
Barriers 
Indonesia -Private sector reluctant to 
invest 
-Huge exploration risks  
-Mismatch between finance 
and needs of project 
developers 
-Issues with PPA and tariffs  
-Forestry Law and the 
2003 Geothermal Law 
-Foreign ownership 45 
(1>10 MW)/ 95 (<10 MW) 
 
-Historical lack of technical 
workforce 
-Limited institutional  
capacity to implement laws 
Philippines -Tariffs – FIT 
-High costs of development 
with new technology (lack 
of quality resources) 
-Risks of no offtake- Power 
sector regime (EPIRA) 
-Protected areas and 
ancestral lands 
-Slow and contradictory 
permitting leads to 
project delays 
-Foreign ownership vs 
40/60 clause 
-Historical lack of technical 
workforce 
-Lower quality resources 
remaining 
-Need for newer technology 
increases costs (Expensive binary 
turbines are needed to extract 
lower quality geothermal 
resources) 
 
This section provides a summary of the major barriers to geothermal development, first in Indonesia 
and then in the Philippines. 
 
Indonesia’s high risks and barriers to development  
A number of barriers to investment in renewable energy technology have been identified in the 
literature and by organizations working on the ground in Indonesia, including financial and 
economic, governance and regulatory, technical and geographic, and lastly, human capacity and 
technical barriers. Examples of Indonesia’s financial and economic barriers include a mismatch 
between available finance and the needs for sustainable energy projects, insufficient subsidy and 
tariff schemes for renewables, and continued investment in fossil fuels, through subsidies. The 
regulatory framework and governance barriers relate to the contradictory laws and policies—in 
particular the Forestry and Mining Laws, further complicated by ongoing corruption and lack of 
coordination among government ministries and local and central government (Transparency 
International, 2013; WWF, 2012). Knowledge barriers describe challenges related to lack of training 
of renewable energy technology deployment in local governments and the technical labor force. 
Looking more specifically at the financial barriers to geothermal development in Indonesia, 
high risks and costs of exploration and development, a mismatch of financial support for project 
developers, reluctance of PLN to sign geothermal contracts, and market failures such as the 
negative externalities of fossil fuel subsidies, are all obstacles to be overcome. Indonesia is unique 
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because the costs of exploration are born by the project developer instead of the government or 
state-owned enterprises, which is common practice around the world. The high costs and risks are 
associated with the four phases of exploration and development in Indonesia including surface 
exploration, temperature-gradient drilling, deep-exploratory drilling and long-term flow testing. The 
first stage of geoscientific exploration and baseline environmental studies (pre-drilling) costs USD 
1 million; the second stage includes the feasibility study, exploration drilling and well testing and 
can cost between USD 25-50 million; the third and final stage is the delineation drilling and technical 
feasibility studies, which costs around USD 1.26 million per MW (Tharakan/ADB, 2015). The 
average cost of a 110 MW plant is around USD 175 million.  
 JICA’s 2009 report on fiscal and non-fiscal incentives for geothermal energy development 
established a benchmark for the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for geothermal projects in Indonesia, 
considering the high commercial and resource development risks associated with development, 
should be 17% compared to 11% IRR for coal-fired plants (JICA, 2009). The 17% IRR is now used 
as a benchmark for geothermal projects by the UNFCCC, to determine when a project is 
commercially viable and in all other cases, the projects are viable to receive CDM funding for 
instance (UNFCCC, 2012).3 In cases where the IRR of geothermal projects is lower than 17%, 
policies need to bridge the price gap through fiscal and non-fiscal incentives. In Table 3 below, 
CDM project documents estimated the expected IRRs for geothermal projects before CDM funding 
was allocated compared to the IRR benchmark for each project based on exploration and 
production costs and risks.  
  
                                                        
3 This benchmark was used for the Rantau Dedap geothermal plant for example. 
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Table 3: Geothermal IRRs for CDM projects in Indonesia 
Date of CER 
allocation 
Project title IRR % 
excl. CER 
IRR 
benchmark 
Investment 
in USD mln 
2008 Sibayak Geothermal Power Plant N/A N/A 12.6 
2009 Lahendong Unit 5 & Unit 6 Geothermal Project 8.71 17.1 211 
2010 Wayang Windu Phase 2 Geothermal Power Project 17.62 18.96 181.4 
2010 Kamojang Geothermal 15.31 N/A 84 
2014 Patuha Geothermal Project 6.73 14.71 109.7 
2014 
Project Ulubelu Unit 3 – 4 PT. Pertamina Geothermal 
Energy 15.98 19.67 271 
2014 
Project Kamojang Unit 5 PT. Pertamina Geothermal 
Energy 14.47 17.91 83.2 
2014 
Project Karaha Unit 1 PT. Pertamina Geothermal 
Energy 14.92 17.91 81.6 
2015 
Project Lumut Balai Unit 1 – 2 PT. Pertamina 
Geothermal Energy 13.99 20.09 281.6 
2015 Liki Pinangawan Muaralaboh Geothermal Power Plant 11.36 17.1 794 
2016 Gunung Rajabasa Geothermal Power Plant 12.18 17.1 
682 
2016 Rantau Dedap Geothermal Power Plant 10.07 17.1 755.6 
2017 
(expected) 
Project Lumut Balai Unit 3 – 4 PT. Pertamina 
Geothermal Energy 16.08 17.92 276.4 
Total investment 3740.1 
Source: UNEP DTU (2016) 
 
Based on these numbers, there are huge gaps between project IRRs and the benchmarks, 
necessitating international development assistance to make projects financially viable, 
demonstrating the additionality of the projects. Bilateral, regional and multilateral organizations 
have tried to address the financial barriers through a variety of types of finance and policy advising. 
   
Philippines power sector uncertainty and major financial barriers  
The first major barrier in the Philippines is regulatory. Many of the remaining geothermal resources 
are located in either ancestral lands or protected areas, and often times overlapping both issues 
(Pascual, 2016; Cerezo, 2016; Marasigan, 2016; van Campen, 2015). These areas are prohibited 
to energy development under the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act, but certain 
territories can be exempt from this law to request for amendments and/or rezoning to territories 
governed under these regulatory frameworks (Lim, 2016; NIPAS, 1992). Procedures to rezone 
protected areas or apply for access to ancestral lands are costly in time and resources—stalling 
project development for years until due diligence requirements, sustainability guidelines, and 
approval at various levels of government are fulfilled. Another regulatory barrier of geothermal 
development in the Philippines is the foreign ownership rule. In renewable energy development, 
foreign companies are only allowed to own 40% of the assets and need to “Filipinize” their 
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companies by partnering with a local company that would then own 60%, coproducing with the 
government or other production sharing agreements. 
 The second major barrier in current geothermal development is technical barriers. There 
is a limited amount of high quality resources remaining (low enthalpy or heat, and high acidity), 
which makes extraction and production more costly and difficult for lower quality resources. 
Policymakers and developers refer to the resources that remain as “secondary resources.” The 
development of these resources requires more expensive technology, such as binary turbines, 
which raises production costs. It is difficult to get a competitive electricity tariff that will cover costs 
let alone compete with other energy sources, which raises questions of whether a feed-in-tariff is 
needed. 
 Lastly, the third major category of barriers to geothermal development is financial barriers. 
The first financial barrier to current geothermal development in the Philippines is that the extraction 
process now requires a more advanced geothermal drilling technology, which is more expensive. 
Project developers argue that a feed-in-tariff may be needed to cover the costs of new technology, 
exploration and development of these secondary resources since the production costs cannot 
compete on the spot market against coal (Hernandez, 2016).  
 The competitiveness gap is well illustrated by CDM documents. As shown in the Philippines 
projects registered with the CDM, the IRRs fall below the benchmark and require international 
finance to be financially viable (see Table 4 below). The project IRR benchmark in the Philippines 
is substantially lower (12-13%) compared with Indonesia (where the IRR benchmark is 17%), owing 
to the lower risk and cost of development in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the project documents 
show gaps between the expected IRRs and IRR benchmarks, necessitating further financing.  
Table 4: Philippines Geothermal Projects IRR and CDM finance 
 
Year 
 
Title 
 
IRR % excl. 
CER 
 
IRR benchmark 
 
Investment in 
US$ millions 
2006 20 MW Nasulo Geothermal Project 9.65 13.2 40.2 
2012 Bac-Man 3 Geothermal Power Project 8.66 12.75 114.3 
2012 Maibarara Geothermal Power Project 8.42 12.0596 79.67 
2013 
50 MW Mindanao Geothermal Power 
Plant 3 Project 
8.16 12.75 109.9 
Total 344 
Source: UNEP DTU (2016) 
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The second financial barrier to geothermal development is the electricity regime. The 
electricity prices in the Philippines are some of the highest in Asia – second highest after Japan 
(KPMG, 2014). Some argue that the high prices are attributed to the remaining independent power 
producer agreements from the Ramos regime (late-1990s) (Hernandez, 2016; KPMG, 2014; Cham, 
2007). Many of the remaining independent power producer contracts are set to expire in 2020, 
which may drive prices back down (Hernandez, 2016). In the current spot market, it is difficult for 
geothermal developers to compete with coal for three main reasons: first, contracts are short and 
there is no guarantee of offtake; second, tariffs are too low at current coal prices and current 
geothermal production costs; and third, distributed utilities are renegotiating tariffs (Uy, 2016; 
Hernandez, 2016). A feed-in-tariff could help provide more certainty from the government to solve 
some of these issues, but there is still a great deal of uncertainty created by the power sector 
regime.  
 There are a number of financial barriers to geothermal development in Indonesia and the 
Philippines that make geothermal projects less competitive comparatively and high-risk 
investments for private interests. This raises doubts as to the economic viability of geothermal 
energy. Despite these limitations, the interest in geothermal energy development remains, 
particularly in Indonesia owing to the potential capacity. In order to bridge the financial gaps in light 
of the reluctant private investment, international development financing has played a key role in 
addressing financial barriers.  
  
5. Addressing barriers through clean energy development aid  
The landscape of clean energy development finance in Indonesia and the Philippines consists of 
the following key actors: multilateral development banks and international organizations, such as 
the Clean Technology Fund (CTF)/CIF, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), World Bank, 
International Finance Corporation (IFC); regional development banks, such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and 
bilateral development agencies, such as German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation 
(GIZ), German Development Corporation (KfW), Japanese International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA)/ Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID),  New Zealand's International Aid & Development Agency (NZAID) , Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD).  In an analysis of the overall flows in geothermal energy 
development aid to Indonesia and the Philippines between the 1980 and 2015, the funding totalled 
USD 6.7 billion in Indonesia and USD 3 billion in the Philippines (KfW et al, 2015; World Bank, 
2016; ADB, 2016; JICA, 2016; UNEP DTU, 2016). The funding for geothermal energy development 
varied from financial assistance, pilot projects, technical assistance and policy advising to training 
and workshops to address the diversity of barriers to geothermal development. See Figure 4 for a 
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depiction of overall trends in clean energy development finance to geothermal energy development 
in Indonesia and the Philippines over time. 
 
Figure 4: Clean energy development assistance to Indonesia and the Philippines over time 
 
Source: KfW et al (2015), World Bank (2016), ADB (2016), JICA (2016), UNEP DTU (2016) 
 
Indonesia geothermal financing 
In order to better understand trends in financial assistance to the geothermal industry in Indonesia, 
data was collected on bilateral, regional and multilateral aid, including World Bank, CDM, CTF, 
ADB, IBRD as the multilateral development banks, and KfW, New Zealand, JICA, Netherlands, and 
Australia Agency for International Development (AusAID). Figure 5 shows trends in financial aid 
flows to geothermal development, power sector development, technical capacity building, policy 
advising and institutional capacity building, and technical assistance, as these tranches of funding 
address relevant barriers.  
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Figure 5: Breakdown of total earmarked international aid for geothermal development in 
Indonesia 
 
 
Source: KfW et al (2015), World Bank (2016), ADB (2016), JICA (2016), UNEP DTU (2016) 
 
From this analysis, there is a clear prioritization of financial assistance to investment in geothermal 
and power transmission (89%). However, less than 1% of funding was provided to policy advising 
and institutional capacity building, suggesting that social learning was not as high a priority for the 
international development institutions or the Government of Indonesia. Technical assistance and 
technical capacity building represented a more significant share of funding at 11%, representing 
the presence of the capacity building mechanism.  
 
Financial and technical barriers and utility modifier mechanism  
To better understand how international institutions interact with domestic political interests at the 
field level, it is important to analyze how the varieties of financial assistance provided address the 
financial and technical barriers. To directly address one of the major financial barriers in 
Indonesia—the lack of government funding for exploration—KfW, ADB and JICA worked with the 
Government of Indonesia to design a revolving fund to finance geothermal projects—the 
Geothermal Fund Facility. The ADB had expressed interest in matching the Government’s 
contribution to the Fund with conditionality that the risk of exploration would be taken on by the 
government; however, the Government was unwilling to agree to these terms for years. The ADB 
66%
23%
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Investment in power
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Technical capacity
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and JICA worked with the government to reframe the risk of exploration from a potential “loss” to a 
gain in terms of geological data (Rahman, 2015).  
The Government contributed IDR 1.2 trillion (USD 102.4 million) to the Fund, which is 
managed by the Pusat Investasi Pemerintah (PIP) – Indonesia’s sovereign wealth fund governed 
by the Ministry of Finance (Damuri and Atje, 2012). The Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 3/2012 
stipulated that the Geothermal Fund will provide financial support to geothermal developers for data 
collection for the exploration activities. The PIP was also supposed to offer loans to geothermal 
developers for exploration activities. In theory, developers can borrow up to USD 30 million – and 
the loan is only to be repaid if the site is proven to be productive, which would reduce financial risks 
during early stages of geothermal development. However, the government is undergoing a process 
of merging the PIP with the state infrastructure financing company (Sarana Multi Infrastruktur) after 
finding that the PIP was unable to function optimally in various investment financing scenarios 
(Cahyafitri, 2015; Halim, 2015). This put the Geothermal Fund in limbo, and created a further 
impasse to financing geothermal development. Finally, in 2017, the Finance Minister Sri Mulyani 
Indrawati issued a regulatory directive on the use, management and accountability of the 
Geothermal Fund Facility, thereby implementing the revolving fund (Jakarta Post, 2017). 
Irrespective of the administrative and political obstacles there are practical concerns since 
the Geothermal Fund is not well fit to the needs of small project developers that need finance the 
most; the Fund requires proof of collateral, which most small project developers do not have 
(Tharakan, 2014). Whereas large project developers have collateral, but the loan offered by the 
Fund is not of interest to these companies since they would not use borrowed money for such a 
high-risk activity, and would use equity instead. Now that the Geothermal Fund is implemented, it 
does have some potential to reduce the expected risk and elimination of the financial barrier to 
geothermal exploration ventures (Wahjosoedibjo and Hasan, 2012). Yet the Fund is not matched 
to the needs of smaller project developers. 
Turning to multilateral funding sources, the CTF and CDM, these finance mechanisms have 
had variable impacts in addressing financial barriers to development. Looking first at the CDM, the 
additionality and motive for CDM registration are both in question in Indonesia. The first geothermal 
project involving domestic actors registered with the CDM was the Lahendong II-20 MW 
Geothermal Project, which involved PLN, the Netherlands, and International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (UNFCCC, 2013). As outlined in the CDM project document for 
the Lahendong Project, the CDM project was considered “additional” not necessarily because of 
there were no other viable alternatives or that the project represented a real financial need; rather 
the project was selected because it presented an opportunity to demonstrate the viability of 
geothermal energy projects to build confidence within the government and state-owned enterprises 
(PLN in particular) of the viability of geothermal energy as a solution to energy demands. This 
demonstrates the utility modifier mechanism: 
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“The fact that 4% of Indonesia’s power is derived from geothermal resources despite 
having 40% of global potential, demonstrates a major disconnect between resource 
potential and geothermal development thus far, best explained by barriers to 
development…PLN recognizes the non-financial benefit of investing in CDM projects 
due to a desire to mitigate the impacts of climate change, as Indonesia has ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol. The successful registration of the project may stimulate 
confidence within PLN and the geothermal sector to make other similar investments” 
(UNFCCC, 2013: 13). 
 
PT Pertamina Geothermal learned of the opportunity to register geothermal projects with the CDM 
to receive Emissions Reduction Credits from meetings with UN actors, PLN, consultancy firms and 
private sector actors (Harahap and Wicaksono, 2015). Pertamina registered 5 of the 12 geothermal 
projects in the CDM registry in time for the 2012 deadline. Pertamina became interested in 
participating in the CDM process for the economic and reputational benefits. The CDM’s repute 
and global recognition “raised Pertamina’s profile”, made geothermal projects more economical 
and helped cover the cost of exploration (Harahap and Wicaksono, 2015). The reputational benefit 
and financial incentive provided by the CDM projects incentivized the government and private 
sector to register CDM projects. The process of registering CDM projects involved multiple 
stakeholders in the public and private sector, and allowed for social learning to take place, which 
drew the line between renewable energy development and emissions reduction. The Pertamina 
CDM project provides support for social learning owing to the transfer of information and ideas 
through multiple layers of domestic political actors. However, as this is not the main objective of 
the CDM in accordance with the additionality methodology, which casts doubts on the effectiveness 
of the CDM in selecting projects with real financial need.4  
The additionality of other projects is also questionable—such as the CDM projects that are 
funding geothermal projects developed by Pertamina Geothermal in addition to Chevron. These 
two companies have the resources to develop geothermal projects, as demonstrated by the 
numerous projects that were developed successfully without CDM financing. Other CDM projects 
that funded smaller Indonesian geothermal developers such as Supreme Energy, more readily 
demonstrate the financial need and additionality of the project, such as the Supreme Energy’s 
Rantau Dedap project.  
The CTF approved an investment plan for Indonesia of USD 400 million in concessional 
financing through the ADB, World Bank and IFC to directly support public-private sector geothermal 
development in 2010 (CIF, 2010; Polycarp et al/WRI, 2013). One project to which the CTF allocated 
funding is to PT Supreme Energy, one of the few private Indonesian companies that managed to 
break through the tangled legal regulations, permitting, exploration and finance issues to develop 
geothermal projects (Shanghai Daily, 2014). One of Supreme Energy’s projects, the Rantau Dedap 
geothermal working area in South Sumatra, was allocated finance from both CDM and the CTF. 
                                                        
4Further literature on CDM additionality and flaws with the financial mechanism can be found by Chan 
(2015) and Castro (2014) 
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The project activity is expected to have an installed capacity of 2x117 MW (234 MW). As written 
into the UNFCCC Project Document, the project would not be commercially viable without climate 
finance (UNFCCC, 2012: 14). CTF financing totaling USD 755.6 million was then allocated to 
Supreme Energy to fill gaps in finance for exploration for its second geothermal working area, 
Rantau Dedap in South Sumatra (Rahman, 2015; ADB, 2014). Supreme Energy, along with GDF 
Suez and Marubeni Corporation (other shareholders in the project) benefitted from a USD 50 million 
non-recourse loan, with security pledged of shares, allocated through the ADB (Rahman, 2015). 
This is the first time a multilateral bank has issued funding for exploration in Indonesia. This 
represents a change in practice of international organizations in the clean energy development 
finance in response to needs on the ground. 
The CTF successfully allocated financing to a couple projects and does not succumb to 
the same limitations of the Geothermal Fund, as it allows for borrowing without requiring a 
government guarantee or collateral. The CTF funding, such as the Indonesia & Philippines Private 
Sector Geothermal Program, provides finance to foster synergies with the existing government 
regulations—in particular, the Fast Track Program II—while attempting to remove the financial 
barriers to technology development. Nevertheless, the CTF is only a short-term solution since it 
has a ‘sunset clause’ that it will expire once the new UNFCCC Paris Agreement financial 
architecture is implemented. 
Turning to regulatory barriers in Indonesia, forestry, mining and geothermal laws have been 
one of the most critical obstacles to geothermal development, and the decentralized authority of 
the government adds further complications. Geothermal development was legally considered part 
of the mining sector according to Article 38(4) of the Forestry Law No. 41/1999, and open pit mining 
is prohibited in Protected and Conservation Forests, aside from a few negotiated exemptions under 
Article 28 (Damuri and Atje; 2012: 21; Harahap and Wicaksono, 2015). This regulation was a 
bulwark to geothermal development because 57% of geothermal resources are thought to be 
located in conservation forests (WWF, 2013: 38). Often higher quality resources – in terms of high 
heat and steam and low acidity – are located in forested areas. These higher quality resources are 
cheaper and easier to develop, and do not require newer, more expensive technology. Industry 
stakeholders such as the Indonesian Geothermal Association and private companies, as well as 
international actors such as the ADB, World Bank, USAID, and WWF have lobbied for reform of 
the geothermal laws, but it has taken over 10 years for any of these changes to be approved by 
the Government (Soesilo, 2014; Poernomo, 2014, Wardhani, 2014).  
The reforms of Geothermal Law 2003 took over 10 years after its implementation. Once 
domestic political interests shifted in favor of geothermal development, the new Geothermal Law 
was adopted in 2014. One of the major changes in the new law was the change of the legal 
definition of geothermal development, which was declassified as “mining” to allow for development 
in forested areas (Cahyafitri, 2014). Another major change was the shift of the tendering authority 
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from local governments to the central government, removing the possibility for rent seeking. So to 
incentivize political convergence of this tenet in the new law, tradeoffs were provided to local 
governments who would still receive a production bonus for geothermal projects (as a substitute 
for rent-seeking).5   
The international development assistance makes up a significant part of finance for 
geothermal energy development in Indonesia. Between 1983 and 2015, approximately 62% of total 
geothermal projects (and approximately 45% of individual units) benefitted from the USD 6.7 billion 
in bilateral, regional and multilateral finance allocated to geothermal development in Indonesia 
(KfW et al, 2015; World Bank, 2016; ADB, 2016; UNEP DTU, 2016) (See Annex I). While the “pilot 
projects” and development finance are used to set examples and promote best practice, they are 
not a permanent solution to geothermal development or a substitute for private finance. However, 
access to private finance for geothermal development is limited in Indonesia due to the high risks 
for development. The World Bank echoes the finance needs in the geothermal sector in its 2009 
project document for the Geothermal Clean Energy Investment Project: 
“The investment needs in the sector are momentous, and it is highly unlikely that 
the private sector alone can meet them. It is estimated that over $12 billion in up-
front financing may be required to achieve the GoI geothermal target, while 
private investments in the entire power sector in Indonesia have only averaged 
about $350 million over the past five years” (World Bank, 2009).  
 
There is a need for growth in levels of private investment in the geothermal industry, but 
this requires major regulatory reforms to remove investment barriers (World Bank, 2009; UNDP, 
2015). In the interim period, international development assistance may need to fill in the gaps. 
 
Overview of clean energy financing for geothermal development in the Philippines  
 
To analyze the overall trends in clean energy financial assistance to geothermal development, data 
was collected from multilateral, regional and bilateral sources. Figure 5 below depicts the overall 
breakdown of earmarked funding for geothermal development in the Philippines.  
 
  
                                                        
5 See Winters and Cawvey (2015) for description of rent-seeking in Indonesia 
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Figure 5: Breakdown of total earmarked funding allocated to geothermal development in the 
Philippines 
 
Source: World Bank (2016), ADB (2016), JICA (2016), UNEP DTU (2016) 
 
The majority of development assistance was focused on geothermal installed capacity, 
representing a share of 63% of funding, with an additional 11% focused on investments in the 
power sector. The remainder of development assistance was dispersed among policy advising and 
institutional capacity building (13%), technical assistance (7%) and technical capacity building 
(6%). This disbursement shows a priority for the utility modifier mechanism through the prioritization 
of building installed capacity in geothermal power plants, as well as installed capacity in the power 
sector (74% of overall funding). Investment in geothermal and power capacity development during 
the 1990s was prioritized by the government of the Philippines in response to the power sector 
crisis. Development actors responded by providing financial assistance for installed capacity to 
meet energy demands. Nonetheless, there was also a sizeable tranche of funding devoted to policy 
advising that represented the social learning aspect of development assistance. This funding was 
specifically targeted to policy advising and institutional capacity building to catalyze private 
investment in the energy sector and to strengthen regulatory capacity for pricing and policy 
implementation, particularly for geothermal field development and power transmission and 
distribution.  
 Looking first at bilateral aid, New Zealand played a large role in early geothermal 
development in the Philippines. Under the Marcos regime, Arturo Alcazar was appointed as the 
Head of Commission of Volcanology and tasked with leading the investigation of geothermal 
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resources for power generation. Alcazar had experience working in the oil and gas sector, and he 
recognized that the Philippines had potential for geothermal resources after observing similar 
developments in New Zealand, Italy and the US. Alcazar is known as the “Father of geothermal 
energy” in the Philippines owing to his leadership efforts to promote the development of these 
resources (Clement, 2016; Ogena, 2016). Alcazar first approached New Zealand with the potential 
for geothermal development in the Philippines. Through cooperation between New Zealand and 
the Philippines through a bilateral agreement, New Zealand provided financial and technical 
assistance and technology transfer to assist in exploration and development of the first geothermal 
sites. The initial group of people with geothermal experience came from the New Zealand 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (Mendiez, 2016). Then following the bilateral 
agreement between New Zealand and the Philippines on geothermal development, the private New 
Zealand consulting company “Kingston, Reynolds, Thom and Allardice,” commonly known KRTA, 
was appointed as the executing agency for the bilateral aid agreement (KRTA, 1979; NZ Listener, 
1981). Between 1973 and 1985 the Philippines received a total of NZ 21.5 million (roughly equal to 
USD at the time) as a grant for geothermal exploration from the New Zealand and KRTA carried 
out the technical assistance in the Philippines in conjunction with the National Power Corporation 
and the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and later, the PNOC-Energy Development 
Corporation (Hochstein, 2005; Mendiez, 2016). 
The geothermal development operated under a service contract system written into the 
1972 Presidential Decree 87, known as the “Oil Exploration and Development Act,” which upheld 
the sovereignty issues of producer-country over the natural resources, and guaranteed a share of 
the product (Velasco, 2006). Under this structure, the Philippines quickly developed 446 MW of 
installed geothermal capacity by 1980. By 1983, the Philippines had already become the second 
largest geothermal producer in the world with the commissioning of Tongonan Unit 1 and 
Palinpinon Unit 1 each with 112.5 MW installed capacity. 6  The New Zealand development 
assistance, representative of the utility modifier and capacity building mechanisms of clean energy 
development finance, was fundamental in assisting the Philippines government in developing its 
geothermal installed capacity, technical workforce and institutional capacity. 
 The majority of the Philippines geothermal capacity was developed under the Marcos 
regime with full government resources and state-owned enterprises dedicated to accelerating 
geothermal development. There was not as great a need for development finance. There are 
increasing flows of development funding during the Ramos era during the 1990s Power Sector 
Crisis when blackouts and energy supply shortages plagued the country; development finance 
helped facilitate reform and incentivize private investment. More recently, the Philippines has 
struggled to develop remaining resources due to dwindling quality of reserves and increasing costs 
of production. The government’s interest in developing remaining resources is diminishing along 
                                                        
6See:  http://www.energy.com.ph/about-edc/milestones/  
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with private sector interest. Newer renewable energy technologies such as solar and wind are 
benefitting from the feed-in-tariff scheme. The Philippines National Geothermal Association is still 
lobbying for newer geothermal technologies to also be included in the feed-in-tariff scheme, but 
this has not yet passed. 
The CDM project for the Nasulo geothermal project is one example of the diminishing 
interest and increasing barriers to geothermal development. The 20 MW Nasulo Geothermal Plant, 
owned and operated by EDC, was registered as a CDM project in 2005 and the development 
assistance was provided to overcome financing barriers. As stated in CDM project documents, “The 
lending bank has made the financing somewhat contingent on the project attaining CDM status. 
Without the CDM, the project would have additional difficulties getting financed” (UNFCCC, 2004: 
16). The project is located in EDC’s the Second Palinpinon geothermal production fields in 
Southern Negros, meaning the field supports existing power plants and contributes towards 
expanding the energy supply in the Visayas grid.  
However, EDC lost interest in the project and the offered CDM funding; the project was 
eventually cancelled in 2012 due to issues related to slow implementation caused by delays with 
resettlement of communities, lack of engagement by EDC due to its recent privatization, rising 
equipment costs and uncertainty related to the off-take of electricity as a result of the Electric Power 
Industry Reform Act (World Bank, 2012). The World Bank was charged with implementing the 
project in cooperation with EDC, and their assessment of the failure of the project is insightful as to 
the incentives and domestic political interests: “One of the main arguments for the “additionality” of 
this project was that it would not happen without CDM because it is financially unattractive…It was 
estimated that the additional revenues from CDM would improve the project's IRR to 10.30% [from 
9.2%]. This engagement demonstrates that additional revenue from CDM helps but is not a 
sufficient incentive for renewable energy development in the Philippines” (World Bank, 2012: 8). 
 The Nasulo project is also insightful as to the high transaction costs for geothermal 
developers participating in CDM projects, because despite the fact that the CDM project was 
cancelled, EDC moved the project forward to completion without CDM revenue (Manila Times, 
2014; Barnett, 2016). This also negates the additionality of the project if the EDC was able to move 
forward without CDM financing, raising questions on the effectiveness of the CDM in selecting 
projects with additionality.  
 
6. Clean energy development finance effectiveness in Indonesia and the Philippines  
This section provides an overview of the three mechanisms of clean energy development finance 
impact—utility modifier, social learning and capacity building—while analyzing overall effectiveness 
in addressing barriers to geothermal development. The most significant way that the clean energy 
development finance impacts the development of clean energy in a developing country is through 
financial incentives, such as financial assistance for geothermal capacity development, 
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representing the utility modifier mechanism. In Indonesia, approximately 62% of total geothermal 
projects (and approximately 45% of units) received international financing, and in the Philippines, 
over 80% of geothermal projects (and approximately 43% of units) received international financing.7  
The analysis in Indonesia and the Philippines revealed different impacts on policy and geothermal 
development.  
In the case of Indonesia’s geothermal energy development, the clean energy development 
finance played an important role in targeting critical financial barriers to development. Major 
bilateral donors included JICA (Japan), Netherlands, Germany (KfW), USAID (US), UK and 
Switzerland. Major multilateral donors included the World Bank, ADB and IFC. The example of the 
CTF and CDM providing a concessional loan to support the exploratory phase of development for 
the Rantau Dedap geothermal project when financial resources were not viable is demonstrative 
of the role of the utility modifier mechanism’s direct impact on geothermal development. However, 
this tranche of funding was not sufficient to fully remove the financial barriers that remain, 
particularly due to the remaining exploration risks. There is an opportunity for the clean energy 
development finance to set up a larger fund to reduce exploration risks for geothermal development 
in Indonesia, which would better address financial barriers than the current ad hoc approach. 
Furthermore, the additionality of CDM projects in Indonesia was questionable, particularly for the 
Chevron and Pertamina projects since their other geothermal projects followed a similar trajectory 
of success without the CDM finance. The development cooperation among bilateral and multilateral 
donors to reform the Geothermal Fund in Indonesia was well-targeted to financial barriers; 
however, it was not very effective in incentivizing policy reform since these processes took 
decades. The funding earmarked for policy advising and institutional capacity building (social 
learning) was minuscule (1%) compared to financial assistance for installed capacity building 
(66%). 
The domestic political interests are a major intervening variable of the overall effectiveness 
of the clean energy development financing in achieving renewable energy objectives in both 
Indonesia and Philippines. There were frequent moments throughout the history of geothermal 
development in Indonesia and the Philippines when domestic political interests interfered in 
geothermal development. In Indonesia, domestic political interests and vested interests in fossil 
fuels have played a role that resulted in the slow implementation of renewable energy policies and 
slow development of geothermal resources. The vested interests were also demonstrated in the 
local governments’ interests in maintaining authority over geothermal bidding: to assuage these 
interests and overcome the opportunity for rent-seeking, the reform of the geothermal law 
transferred the tendering authority to the central government but also included a production bonus 
for local communities were geothermal projects take place. Similarly, the domestic political interests 
                                                        
7 Figures calculated by collecting data on all geothermal projects in Indonesia and the Philippines and data 
on international development finance for geothermal development. See Annex 1 and 2. 
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in the Philippines shifted away from geothermal energy in the early 2000s - interests in coal and 
other renewables became more prominent. The Renewable Energy Law passed in 2002, but 
geothermal was not one of the major renewable energy technologies promoted through the feed-
in-tariff scheme. The cases of Indonesia and the Philippines provide support for the argument that 
convergence of domestic political interests is necessary for significant policy reform to pass and be 
implemented in order to facilitate geothermal development.  
The clean energy development finance earmarked for geothermal capacity development 
was often coupled with policy advising for regulatory reform of Geothermal Law 2003. However, it 
took over 10 years for the government to make necessary regulatory changes providing evidence 
of vested domestic political interests that were not incentivized by development assistance. While 
the financial assistance and policy advising helped incentivize the development of geothermal 
capacity to address financial barriers and foster regulatory reform, the financial assistance alone 
was insufficient to reduce risks enough to spur private investment in the geothermal sector. Clean 
energy development projects may need to address vested interests to fully remove political barriers 
and facilitate social learning. International development projects should better incorporate political 
economy analyses into the financing mechanism, rather than assuming conditions where vested 
interests do not exist. Furthermore, the development finance could target investments in social 
learning to train and incentivize local entrepreneurship among leaders and institutions at a sub-
national level to overcome vested interests. 
Nevertheless, the amelioration of financial and regulatory barriers and subsequent growth 
in geothermal energy capacity in Indonesia is unlikely to have been possible in the absence of 
financial and technical support from the clean energy development finance. The development 
financial support for geothermal development in Indonesia was over USD 6.7 billion between 1983 
and 2015 (KfW et al, 2015; World Bank, 2016; ADB, 2016; UNEP DTU, 2016).8 This funding is 
substantial as standalone finance, but it was also combined with technical assistance, technical 
capacity building and conditionality that gradually reformed policy and ameliorated some of the 
persistent barriers to geothermal energy development in Indonesia. Looking to the financial 
resources alone, this funding could not have been mobilized by the Indonesian Government or 
domestic companies or provided solely through direct foreign investment, considering the 
unresolved regulatory barriers, high-risk investment environment in Indonesia and reluctant private 
sector. This is echoed by the World Bank project document referenced above which argued that 
while private finance has averaged USD 350 million a year over the last five years, up-front 
financing needs are closer to USD 12 billion to achieve geothermal targets, requiring international 
support (World Bank, 2009).  
                                                        
8 Calculated from bilateral, regional and multilateral aid data, including World Bank, CTF, ADB, as the 
multilateral development banks, and KfW, New Zealand, JICA, Netherlands, and AusAID. This does not 
exclude private finance, but these numbers were not readily accessible.  
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In the case of the Philippines, financial and technical assistance (utility modifier and 
capacity building mechanisms) to geothermal projects was vital in early stages of development. 
Major bilateral donors included New Zealand, JICA (Japan), and multilateral donors included the 
World Bank, ADB and IFC. Overall, the utility modifier mechanisms appeared to have more of an 
impact in Indonesia in incentivizing change than in the Philippines, since the political will under 
Marcos to develop geothermal capacity using government resources predated the clean energy 
development finance. Since the 1970s, international assistance has been provided to fill in gaps in 
financing for geothermal projects in the Philippines, representing the utility modifier mechanism. 
Between 1980 and 2010, financing from JICA, bilateral donors through the CDM, World Bank, ADB 
and IFC to support geothermal development in the Philippines amounted to USD 3 billion (World 
Bank, 2016; ADB, 2016; JICA, 2016; UNEP DTU, 2016). Financial barriers are rising in the 
Philippines as the costs of geothermal development increase as quality resources become scarce 
and more expensive technology is needed to develop resources. Furthermore, the CDM project 
documents cast doubts as to the additionality of projects in the Philippines, as evidenced with the 
EDC Nasulo project. The clean energy financing in the Philippines no longer matches the needs 
on the ground. Project developers discuss the need for a feed-in-tariff and development agencies 
discuss potential financial mechanisms that could fill in financing gaps, such as those used in 
Indonesia with the CTF. However, clean energy development finance is diminishing in recent 
geothermal development in the Philippines. The trends in clean energy finance (Figure 4) show an 
overall decline in financial assistance for geothermal capacity (utility modifier) over time. While 
there still remain opportunities for development agency engagement in developing secondary 
geothermal resources in the Philippines, this may be eclipsed by better opportunities for energy 
development with other renewable energy technologies.  
Overall these case studies reveal the clean energy development finance has limited 
effectiveness in overcoming barriers to geothermal energy development in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. There was supporting evidence that the major intervening factors in effectiveness were 
domestic political interests and material resources as influential in determining policy choices 
supporting particular energy resources and technologies over others. In the Philippines, the 
government’s will (motivated by energy crises) to develop geothermal resources predated flows of 
clean energy finance so it cannot be claimed that the finance incentivized renewable energy 
development. It did however fill in gaps in financial and technical assistance. Similarly in Indonesia, 
external shocks influenced the government’s will to prioritize renewable energy development. The 
financial and technical assistance and policy advising filled in critical gaps in finance and helped to 
address some financial and regulatory barriers, though there are substantial risks that remain. 
Without the removal of remaining risks and barriers, the private investment will continue to remain 
limited and development finance will not be able to fill in the remaining financial gaps necessary to 
spur geothermal development to its full potential. 
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7. Conclusions and policy insights 
The literature analyzing clean energy governance lacks a depth of analysis in how effective the 
clean energy finance addresses specific barriers to renewable energy development in developing 
countries. This paper attempts to contribute to gaps in the literature by focusing on two under-
researched case studies and delving into an in-depth comparative analysis of barriers renewable 
energy development, and the extent to which development finance matches and addresses these 
barriers.  
Major findings indicate that while clean energy development finance targeted major barriers 
to geothermal energy development, it was not effective in removing fully removing the barriers or 
addressing major domestic political interests in Indonesia. In both cases, political will is a pre-
determinant of development finance effectiveness, as opposed to expectations that the clean 
energy development finance would incentivize renewable energy development. Once the 
respective governments prioritized geothermal energy development, the clean energy development 
finance helped address barriers through financial and technical assistance and capacity building. 
The utility modifier mechanism was overwhelmingly the priority of the clean energy development 
finance, representing two-thirds of overall funding in Indonesia and the Philippines. Social learning 
and capacity building was underfunded, particularly in Indonesia, where vested interests remain a 
barrier to development. Another important insight learned from this research is the challenge of the 
macro-level approach to international development when the measures of success and 
effectiveness are determined at a project level; this leads to a micro-level focus as opposed to a 
systemic approach that incorporates better collaboration and inter-agency coordination to solve 
macro-level problems. 
This research is important in helping to determine the overall impact of renewable energy 
development finance and policy insights for designing the post-Paris Agreement finance 
mechanism. The impacts of the clean energy development finance in Indonesia and the Philippines’ 
renewable energy development provide insight into some of the disparities between resources 
provided by clean energy development finance and the actual needs on the ground. Clean energy 
development projects may need to better address vested political interests to fully remove political 
barriers and facilitate social learning and capacity building to empower local entrepreneurs to foster 
renewable energy development. Moving forward, political economy analyses should be 
incorporated into the clean energy financing mechanisms, rather than top-down approach across 
developing countries using assumptions of conditions where vested interests do not exist or do not 
vary country to country. 
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Annex 1: Indonesia Geothermal Development and International Development Aid10 
 
Start 
date/ 
Funding 
date 
Power Plant Unit Capacity 
(MW) 
Steamfield 
ownership 
Geothermal 
power plant 
ownership 
Type of aid Aid (in 
US$ 
mln) 
Donor Org/ 
Country 
Status 
1982 Kamojang Unit 1 30 PLN-PGE PLN Investment 69 KfW/Germany Completed 
1987 Unit 2 60 PLN-PGE PLN   UK 
 
 
 
Completed 
1987 Unit 3 60 PLN-PGE PLN   Completed 
2008 Unit 4 63 PLN-PGE IPP CDM/ 
CER 
84 Completed 
2015 Unit 5 35 PLN-PGE  CDM/ 
CER 
83.2 Switzerland Completed 
1993 Gunung 
Salak 
Unit 1 55 IP-Chevron PLN      Completed 
1994 Unit 2 55 IP-Chevron PLN     Completed 
1997 Unit 3 55 IP-Chevron PLN     Completed 
1997 Unit 4 65 Chevron Salak IPP     Completed 
1997 Unit 5 65 Chevron Salak IPP     Completed 
1997 Unit 6 65 Chevron Salak IPP     Completed 
1994 Darajat Unit 1 55 IP-Chevron PLN       Completed 
2000 Unit 2 90 Chevron Darajat IPP       Completed 
2007 Unit 3 110 Chevron Darajat IPP CDM /CER  ? UK Completed 
2000 Wayang 
Windu 
Unit 1 110 Star Energy IPP CDM/CER  181.4 UK Completed 
2009 Unit 2 110 Star Energy IPP       Completed 
2002 Lahendong Unit 1 20 PLN-PGE PLN Investment 47.6 JICA Completed 
2007 Unit 2 20 
PLN-PGE 
 
 
PLN CDM/CER  ? Netherlands Completed 
Investment 28.75 World Bank Completed 
2009 Unit 3 20 PLN-PGE PLN Investment 260 JICA Completed 
2011 Unit 4 20 PLN-PGE PLN TA 7.4 New Zealand/World Bank Completed 
2016/201
7 
Unit 5 &6 40 PLN-PGE  CDM /CER 211  Completed 
2008 Sibayak Unit 1 12 PGE/Dizamarta P IPP  CDM/CER  12.6 UNFCCC Completed 
2002 Dieng Unit 1 60 Geodipa Energy IPP     Completed 
2010 Seulawah Unit 1   Gov of Aceh?  Investment 8.86 KfW Completed 
2010 Mataloko Unit 1 1.5 PLN PLN       Completed 
                                                        
10 Adapted from KfW et al 2015, World Bank 2016, ADB 2016, UNEP DTU 2016; Yunis 2015 
Blue= received development aid; White: no development aid 
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2011 Ulumbu 
 
Unit 2 2.5 PLN PLN       Completed 
2012 Unit 1 2.5 PLN PLN       Completed 
2014 Unit 1 and 2 
(ADB) 
5 PLN PLN       Completed 
2012 Ulubelu Unit 1 55 PLN-PGE PLN Investment 175 JICA Completed 
2012 Unit 2 55 PLN-PGE PLN    Completed 
2012 Unit 3 55 PLN-PGE PLN CDM/CER 271 Switzerland Completed 
2012 Unit 4 55 PLN-PGE PLN   Completed 
2012 Lumut Balai  Unit 1 55 Geodipa Energy IPP CDM /CER  109.7  
 
 
Switzerland 
 
In construction 
2012 Unit 2    CDM  In construction 
2012 Unit 3    CDM  In construction 
2012 Unit 4    CDM  In construction 
2012 Gunung 
Rajabasa 
Unit 1    CDM  Netherlands In construction 
2012 Liki 
Pinangawan 
Muaralaboh 
Unit 1    CDM  Netherlands In construction 
2012 Rantau 
Dedap 
Unit 1    CDM  Germany Feasibility study 
2012 Karaha Unit 1    CDM  Switzerland Completion 
expected (2017) 
2012 Patuha Unit 1 55 Geodipa Energy IPP CDM /CER  109.7 UK Completed 
2010 Sorik Merapi  Unit 1 240  KS Orka 
Renewables Pte 
Ltd 
IPP    Completion 
expected (2017) 
2005 Sarulla Unit 1 110 PT Medco Energi 
International 
(27.5%), Ormat 
Technologies 
(12.75%), Itochu 
(25%) and 
Kyushu Electric 
(25%) 
IPP    Completed 
2005 Unit 2 110 IPP    Completion 
expected (2017) 
2005 Unit 3 110 IPP    In construction 
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Annex 2: Philippines Geothermal installed capacity and development financing11 
 
Start 
date/ 
Funding 
date  
Power plant Unit Capacity (MW) 
Power plant 
operator 
Steamfield 
operator Aid (in 
US$ mln) Donor Org Donor Type Status 
1979 
Makban (Laguna) 
A 126.4  NPC 
PGI 
      
Completed 
1980 B 126.4  NPC 
PGI 
      
Completed 
1984 C 110  NPC 
PGI 
      
Completed  
1995 
Makban Modular 
(Laguna) 
D 40  NPC 
PGI 
      
Completed 
1995 E 40  NPC 
PGI 
      
Completed 
1994 
Makban Binary 
(Laguna) 
Binary I   NPC 
PGI 
      
Completed  
1994 Binary II   NPC 
PGI 
60.5 JICA  Bilateral Completed 
1994 Binary III   NPC 
PGI 
      
Completed 
1979 
Tiwi 
A 120  NPC 
PGI 
 13.9 NZ  Bilateral 
Completed 
1980 B    NPC 
PGI 
      
Completed 
1982 C 114  NPC 
PGI 
64.4 JICA  Bilateral Completed 
1993 
Albay-Sorsogon 
Bacman I 110  NPC 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
1994 
Bacman II-
Cawayan 20  NPC 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
1998 Bacman II-Botong    NPC 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
  Bacman III    NPC 
PNOC EDC 
114.3 CDM  Multilateral 
Completed 
1998 Manito-Lowland    NPC 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
1983 
Tongonon (Leyte) 
Tongonan I 112.5  NPC 
PNOC EDC 
171.7 JICA Bilateral Completed 
1996 
Upper Mahiao 
GCCU** (Main 
plant) 136.48  CalEnergy/Omat 
PNOC EDC 
 3 NZ  Bilateral 
Completed 
1996 
Upper Mahiao 
OEC*** (Brine 
plant) 5.5   
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
1997 Malitbog 232.5  CalEnergy 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
1997 Mahanagdong 180   CalEnergy/Omat 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
1997 
Tongonan I- 
optimization 19.5  NPC 
PNOC EDC 
364.5 World Bank  Multilateral Completed 
1997 
Mahandong A - - 
optimization 13   CalEnergy/Omat 
PNOC EDC 
126.7 World Bank  Multilateral Completed 
1997 
Mahanagdong B -  
- optimization 6.5   CalEnergy/Omat 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
                                                        
11 Data taken from: World Bank 2016, ADB 2016, JICA 2016, UNEP DTU 2016; Dolor 2006 
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1997 
Malitbong - - 
optimization 16.7   CalEnergy/Omat 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
1983 
Southern Negros 
Palinpinon I 112.5  NPC 
PNOC EDC 
98.6 JICA Bilateral Completed 
1994 
Palinpinon II - 
Okoy 5 20  NPC 
PNOC EDC 
57.5 JICA Bilateral Completed 
1994 
Palinpinon II - 
Nasuji 20  NPC 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
1995 
Palinpinon II - 
Sogongon 40  NPC 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
2007 Northern Negros NNGP     
 
132 JICA  Bilateral 
Failed 
1997 
Mindanao  
(Mt Apo) 
Mindanao I 54.24  Marubeni 
PNOC EDC 
      
Completed 
1999 Mindanao II 54.24  Marubeni 
PNOC EDC 
109.9   CDM   
Completed 
2014 Laguna/Batangas Maibarara     
 
79.6 CDM  Multilateral 
Completed 
 2014 Southern Negros - 
Nasulo 
  
Unit 1 
 
  
  
  
  
 
PNOC EDC 2.7 World Bank  Multilateral 
Completed 
 2006 40.2 
Netherlands 
(CANCELLED)  Multilateral 
Completed 
 
 
